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7. The constitutional referendum in historical 
perspective
Zachary Elkins and Alexander Hudson
“I was the future once.”
David Cameron (his final words in the House of Commons, July 13, 2016)
As miscalculations go, David Cameron’s decision to hold the Brexit referendum in 2016 
must be one of the most regretted. The second-guessing and hand-wringing started 
almost as soon as the ballot results came in and may never stop. Not ones to resist piling 
on, we contribute to the post-mortem here by assembling and analyzing the historical 
record. You may wonder, as we do, what citizens typically do when asked to back elite 
decisions about matters of higher law? Yea-say, one would think (contra Brexit). But who 
really knows? For that matter, when and where has the constitutional1 referendum been 
used, how often, and to what effect?
Referenda – and, for us, it is “referenda” not “referendums”2 – have seemingly become 
a ubiquitous means of ratifying constitutional change. Countries as diverse as Iceland and 
Uruguay have used referenda in recent years. Indeed, we find that constitutional referenda 
truly are on the rise, becoming increasingly common especially after 1990. The majority of 
new constitutions are now approved through referenda. As of 2018, 69 of the 194 national 
constitutions currently in force (35.6 percent) were ratified through a referendum. And one 
would expect that figure to rise in the next decade. Importantly, we find that referenda on new 
(replacement) constitutions almost never fail, while referenda on amendments fail almost 40 
percent of the time. We explore this difference and offer some possible explanations for it. 
We also describe many of the contextual elements of constitutional referenda, such as the 
regions where constitutional referenda have been more common, the relationship between 
ratifying referenda and democracy, the trends in usage over time, and the characteristics of 
the cases in which voters declined to ratify a new constitution. We begin with a broad review 
of the literature on referenda, and constitutional referenda in particular, and then introduce 
an original set of data that we have collected to answer such questions.
1 While not included in the data we use for analysis here, the Brexit referendum motivates 
some of our theorizing throughout the chapter. 
2 The plural of referendum is controversial, with apparently no technically correct version 
(referendum is a gerund of a Latin verb, with no Latin plural). “Referendums” sounds wrong 
to many; “referenda” sounds right but rests on shaky grammatical footing. It is exactly this sort 
of impasse for which the referendum was made, and a reporter at the Daily Edge has obliged. 
Interested readers can weigh in here: www.dailyedge.ie/lets-figure-this-out-whats-the-real-plural-
of-referendum-261522-Oct2013/. As of this writing “referenda” holds a sizable majority at 59 
percent, with 5,190 (and counting) readers having voted. In second place is the choice “have we 
nothing better to vote on?” at 25 percent. “Referendums” sits at distant third place with 17 percent. 
It may be that scholars prefer “referundums,” but the people have spoken.
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I. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A. Concepts
The conceptual terrain surrounding constitutional referenda is somewhat rocky. A 
primary conceptual distinction is that between referenda and plebiscites. It turns out that 
the terms have specific legal meanings in different jurisdictions. For example, in Australia, 
the term “referendum” is reserved for popular votes on constitutional amendments 
(conducted with mandatory voting and binding results), while the government may 
also call “plebiscites” to consult the public on other issues (these are non-binding, and 
voting is not usually compulsory). David Altman, a central scholar in this domain, notes 
that there are some differences between US and European scholars in the use of these 
terms.3 He himself  uses the term “plebiscite” to describe many votes that others would 
count as “referenda.” Still others, including us, discern little practical difference between 
the two terms.4 Nevertheless, for purposes of this chapter, we define a referendum as 
any government-sanctioned vote on a proposed piece of legislation, or amendment to 
legislation. These votes may be binding or merely advisory, legally required or optional, 
elite- or citizen-initiated. Votes that meet our broad criterion of a government-sanctioned 
vote and that seek public approval of a new constitution or constitutional amendment are 
included in our dataset.
One can also differentiate among referenda on the basis of the type of  question that 
is addressed. Some of the most well-known and controversial referenda have considered 
sub-national secession or accession of new territories. In some countries (and some US 
states), referenda are also held to address policy questions. However, we limit our data 
collection and analysis to referenda on questions of an explicitly constitutional nature. 
Certainly, referenda on issues such as secession have constitutional importance, but we 
see referenda on national autonomy and public policy as reasonably distinct from those 
on constitutional change.5
As noted above, we include both optional and mandatory referenda in our data and 
analysis. That is, elections that are optional or mandatory for elites to hold, not for voters 
to participate. The degree to which referenda on constitutional change are legally man-
dated varies from case to case, and is further complicated by the fact that many constitu-
tions provide more than one path for constitutional change. It is also important to note 
that constitutional replacement does not always follow the procedure for constitutional 
amendment described in the existing text. Furthermore, in some cases referenda have been 
thought to be required for constitutional reform even when the constitutional text did not 
clearly stipulate such (as in the case of Kenya’s 2005 referendum).6
3 David Altman, Direct Democracy Worldwide (Cambridge University Press 2010) 10.
4 David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds.), Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and 
Theory. AEI Studies 216 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1978); Mark 
Clarence Walker, The Strategic Use of Referendums: Power, Legitimacy, and Democracy (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2003) 135.
5 Walker, ibid, 9.
6 The decision was made by the Nairobi High Court in Timothy Njoya v. Attorney General, 
(2004) 4 LRC 559 (Kenya HC).
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A final distinction is between referenda that are binding and those that are simply 
advisory. And, of course, like any rule and custom, “binding” can operate in degrees, as 
political considerations may be more important than legal requirements in some cases. 
While most of the referenda in our data were of a binding nature, we also include a few 
advisory referenda (e.g. Canada 1992), as these have often functioned as if  they were bind-
ing. Our analysis does not focus on differences between either optional and mandatory 
or binding and advisory, although we recognize these as distinctions worth investigating.
B. Ivory-tower Views of Referenda and their Merits
The spark that ignited contemporary scholarly interest in referenda (at least among 
Anglophones) seems to have been the two referenda in the United Kingdom in the 1970s: 
the 1973 referendum on the future of Northern Ireland, and the 1975 referendum on 
remaining in the European Economic Community (a decision subsequently reversed 
by 2016’s Brexit referendum). However, constitutional theorists have been interested in 
the possibilities of referenda in constitutional reform since at least the late 19th century, 
when Dicey argued that the devices’ use for amendment approval could protect constitu-
tions from self-serving changes on the part of the government of the day.7 Referenda, 
of course, have their roots in ancient Greece, and were revived in Europe following the 
French Revolution. Their use has steadily increased since then, as we shall see. The 
literature on referenda is presently anchored by what turned into something of a series of 
edited volumes, first by Butler and Ranney,8 and continued by Qvortrup.9
Butler and Ranney summarized with great breadth the theoretical arguments for and 
against the use of referenda, and we will not attempt to repeat their synthesis here.10 
Briefly, referenda were advocated by early 20th century Progressives on the grounds 
that the most legitimate way to make a political decision was through a measurement of 
the unmediated opinions of the people.11 The Progressives further argued that decision 
making through referenda would yield decisions on a more complete set of political 
issues, increase transparency in decision making, more accurately express the general will 
of the political community, end apathy, and help individuals maximize their potential.12 
A democratic panacea, of sorts. To these arguments we could add that decision making 
through referenda might increase discussion of political issues, and public investment in 
important decisions.13
Leaning heavily again on Butler and Ranney,14 we can recite an equally long bill of 
7 Albert Venn Dicey, ‘Ought the Referendum to Be Introduced into England?’ (1890) 57 The 
Contemporary Review 489–511.
8 Butler and Ranney, Referendums: A Comparative Study; David Butler and Austin Ranney 
(eds.), Referendums around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy (AEI Press 1994).
9 Mads Qvortrup (ed.), Referendums around the World: The Continued Growth of Direct 
Democracy (Palgrave Macmillan 2014).
10 Butler and Ranney, Referendums: A Comparative Study, 23–27.
11 Ibid, 24.
12 Ibid, 24–33.
13 Mads Qvortrup, A Comparative Study of Referendums: Government by the People (Palgrave 
2002).
14 Butler and Ranney, Referendums: A Comparative Study, 34–37.
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particulars against referenda. Arguments against might mention a referendum’s potential 
to weaken the institutions of representative government, in general, and legislatures in 
particular; a lack of sufficient knowledge and interest on the part of ordinary citizens; a 
referendum’s inability to measure intensity of preferences; its proclivity towards dissensus 
over consensus; and the possibility of a decision that harms minorities. Building on some 
of these critiques, more recent scholars have suggested that without careful design, refer-
enda may stifle democratic deliberation.15 Additionally, there is some anecdotal evidence 
that expansions in direct democracy have gone hand-in-hand with expanded executive 
powers, as in the recent Andean constitutions.16
The scholarly consensus at this point seems to be that referenda reflect the political 
context in which they take place. They are in many cases salutary additions to a system 
of representative democracy, but can also be used by authoritarian regimes to provide 
a democratic cover for anti-democratic decisions.17 Walker is particularly critical of 
referenda and suggests that:
Political actors use referendums to achieve their goals. They do so deliberately and sometimes 
manipulatively with respect to the general public. . . Actors in nondemocratic regimes have used 
referendums for the same purpose. Indeed authoritarian states have developed a fondness for 
referendums because they grant legitimacy to a policy position and the implementers of the 
device by utilizing the vote of the people.18
And, while referenda are sometimes understood to be an objective means of determin-
ing Rousseau’s “general will,” or a method for making “correct” decisions, these conten-
tions have been questioned on both normative and empirical grounds.19
Even if  one accepts that referenda have great potential to offer the public a meaningful 
voice in important decisions, one must still deal with the potential for manipulation. 
Setälä argues that manipulation can take place on three levels: procedural manipulation, 
manipulation of the public agenda, and manipulation of public preferences.20 Procedural 
manipulation can begin with the timing of the vote,21 but is perhaps most obviously seen 
in things such as the wording of referendum questions. Even in the seemingly simple 
remain/leave choice in Brexit, the wording of the question was controversial.22 Both 
15 Simone Chambers, ‘Constitutional Referendums and Democratic Deliberation’ in Matthew 
Mendelsohn and Andrew Parkin (eds.), Referendum Democracy: Citizens, Elites, and Deliberation 
in Referendum Campaigns (Palgrave 2001) 231–255; Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: 
The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation. Oxford Constitutional Theory (Oxford 
University Press 2012).
16 Zachary Elkins, ‘Constitutional [R]evolution in the Andes’ in Ros Dixon and Tom Ginsburg 
(eds.), Comparative Law in Latin America (Routledge 2017).
17 Maija Setälä, Referendums and Democratic Government: Normative Theory and the Analysis 
of Institutions (Springer 1999); Qvortrup, A Comparative Study of Referendums; Walker, The 
Strategic Use of Referendums.
18 Walker, ibid, 1.
19 Setälä, Referendums and Democratic Government, 161.
20 Ibid, 161–162. 
21 Walker, The Strategic Use of Referendums, 2.
22 The original proposal for the question wording (in a private member’s bill) was “Do you 
think the UK should be a member of the European Union?” The UK’s Electoral Commission 
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journalists and politicians pointed to framing effects and psychological biases as potential 
sources of manipulation in question wording.23 As with any electoral device, there is 
ample opportunity for manipulation of the vote count as well. In the constitutional ref-
erendum in Turkey in April 2017, the margin of success was very narrow, and opponents 
of the change were quick to point to signs of irregularities in the vote.24
The frequent use of  referenda by authoritarian regimes has been a subject of  some 
fascination for scholars. Butler and Ranney suggest, “Perhaps it should be seen as a 
tribute to the power of  democratic ideology that countries which lack the reality of  open 
discussions and freely voted consent should embrace its forms.”25 They go on to note that 
while there are only a few examples in which the outcome was ever in any doubt in an 
authoritarian referendum, it is surprising that the referendum device should ever be used 
at all in that context. Altman observes that such long-tenured autocrats as Ceausescu, 
Lukashenko, “Baby Doc” Duvalier, and Marcos, regularly resorted to referenda to 
advance their agenda.26 The Nazi regime in Germany also used referenda at several 
critical points in its process of  consolidating power. However, it was also a referendum 
– long-promised and dutifully carried out – that ultimately removed Pinochet from 
power in Chile in 1988. There is certainly a calculation of  risk and reward that leads an 
authoritarian regime to submit its policy to a referendum – it seems that many autocrats 
have either made this calculation correctly, or have manipulated the process to ensure a 
favorable result.
Even in well-functioning democracies, the vast majority of referenda would seem to 
result in a “yes” vote. While this skewed result may be an effect of acquiescence bias, it 
may also be one of selection bias. That is, it is probable that in discretionary cases, elites 
do not submit questions to referenda unless they are reasonably certain of the outcome. 
Butler writes:
Most referendums are not to decide anything but to legitimize faits accomplis. . . The subject 
matter of referendums provides the explanation. They have been called, in the main, to endorse 
some well-matured constitutional or territorial change and they would not have been put before 
the people unless there was good reason to suppose they would be accepted.27
thought that this wording was both confusing (current status is unclear) and leading. The final 
question was: “Should the UK remain a member of the European Union or leave the European 
Union?” Instead of a yes/no response option, the options were written out as “Remain a member 
of the European Union,” or “Leave the European Union.”
23 Mark Gilbert, ‘Cameron’s Trick Question on UK’s Future in EU’ Bloomberg View, 
September 2, 2015. www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-09-02/cameron-s-trick-question-on-u-
k-s-future-in-eu; Jon Henley, ‘The Power of Yes: Why the Wording of Britain’s EU Referendum 
Matters’ The Guardian, May 27, 2015, sec. Politics. www.theguardian.com/politics/shortcuts/2015/
may/27/power-of-yes-why-wording-of-britains-eu-referendum-matters.
24 Patrick Kingsley, ‘Videos Fuel Charges of Fraud in Erdogan’s Win in Turkey Referendum’. 
The New York Times, April 18, 2017, sec. Europe. www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/world/europe/
turkey-referendum-is-haunted-by-allegations-of-voter-fraud.html.
25 Butler and Ranney, Referendums: A Comparative Study, 9.
26 Altman, Direct Democracy Worldwide.
27 David Butler, ‘The World Experience’ in Austin Ranney (ed.), The Referendum Device: A 
Conference (The Institute 1981).
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This is clearly different from the dynamic in countries where citizens can propose 
referenda. However, in the vast majority (if  not all) of the cases we consider here, the 
referendum was either constitutionally required, or proposed by the government of the 
day. Perhaps because referenda can be used by governments of any political stripe, Butler 
and Ranney find that contrary to the folk theory of the referendum, the device does not 
have an inherently conservative bias; it has been used, and abused, for both conservative 
and progressive ends.28
C. On Constitutional Referenda in Particular
Our specific focus in this chapter is on the use of referenda to ratify constitutional change, 
which happens to be a common theme in the literature on referenda. In its revival since 
the 18th century, the referendum has been closely tied to constitutional change. The earli-
est modern use of referenda was in ratifying state constitutions in the United States of 
America in the late 18th century.29 Around the same time, there were a series of referenda 
in the states that we now know as the Netherlands and Switzerland. Indeed, in one of 
the first attempts to catalog the use of national-level referenda, Butler and Ranney found 
that the majority of referenda until that time had been on constitutional questions.30 As 
we note above, some of the most important theoretical work on referenda was motivated 
by concerns about constitutional change in the United Kingdom. Dicey, for one, worried 
about parliamentary sovereignty.31 For him, the combination of a multi-document 
constitution, an upper chamber that is increasingly powerless, and a monarch that is 
unlikely to withhold royal assent from a bill that was duly passed in parliament, translated 
to higher law that is at the mercy of the governing coalition in the lower house. He found 
this situation to be troubling, and argued (using the example of the Swiss process of 
constitutional reform) that referenda could prevent the UK’s government of the day from 
changing the constitution in ways that were in its blatant self-interest.
At a theoretical level, the most important characteristic that distinguishes constitutional 
referenda from those on policy questions, or national autonomy, is that constitutional 
referenda often address questions about the distribution of power (either vertically or 
horizontally) among political institutions. As Walker describes, a referendum in this 
domain introduces the citizenry as an independent arbiter in a dispute between political 
institutions.32 This dynamic is considerably different from referenda on policy questions. 
While it is not clear whether citizens are better suited to make good decisions about policy 
or about constitutional change, the possibility that citizens can be arbiters in disputes 
between political institutions may be normatively appealing to some. For others, the 
concern is that the public vote will be manipulated in contests that are over rather abstract 
institutional ideas.33
28 Butler and Ranney, Referendums: A Comparative Study.
29 However, we do not include sub-national constitutions in the data presented here. Our first 
observation is France’s 1793 referendum.
30 Butler and Ranney, Referendums: A Comparative Study.
31 Dicey, ‘Ought the Referendum to Be Introduced’.
32 Walker, The Strategic Use of Referendums, 13.
33 Setälä, Referendums and Democratic Government.
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Within the subset of referenda that propose changes to constitutions, we make a 
further distinction between those that seek to ratify a new constitution, and those that 
seek approval for amendments. Tierney considers more types of constitutional referenda 
in his book-length analysis, but notes that the distinction between replacement and 
amendment is particularly critical and may have implications for legitimacy.34 Relatedly, 
Tierney invokes Kalyvas’ distinction between “command sovereignty” and “constituent 
sovereignty” in his discussion of the sources of authority for constitutional change.35 
The first source of sovereignty is original and fundamental, while the other is delegative. 
According to Tierney, referenda on constitutional amendments do not rise to the level of 
constituent sovereignty, operating instead within the command sovereignty of the existing 
constitution. Referenda on new (replacement) constitutions take on a special significance 
as in these instances, “the people act as original constitutional authors, bringing about a 
clear break in the old order; and whether forming new states or new constitutions they 
imbue the new construct with a new popular source of legitimacy.”36 This is an important 
theoretical insight, which may help us to better understand how citizens might view their 
responsibility in these different contexts. Of course, the difference between a package of 
amendments and a replacement constitution could be essentially semantic. Formally, at 
least in our formulation, the distinction between a “new” constitution, and an “amended” 
constitution hinges on the process through which the text was developed (does the reform 
result from the amendment procedure or not). But new constitutions can be quite similar 
to those they replace (the most obvious example being the series of 35 constitutions in 
the 200 years of the Dominican Republic), while some constitutions have through amend-
ment become wholly new creations (witness how Mexico’s 1917 constitution has evolved 
over 100 years). Still, for reasons that we describe below, we expect to see non-trivial differ-
ences in the behavior of voters in amendment as against replacement conditions. Indeed, 
in the data we describe below, we find that referenda on amendments are considerably less 
likely to pass than are referenda on wholesale replacemens of constitutions. Much of this 
difference, we suggest, turns on cognitive differences in the way that voters approach and 
comprehend discrete as opposed to comprehensive reform.
II. DATA AND ANALYSIS
A. Our Data
We introduce here a new set of original cross-national historical data on referenda and 
their outcomes (Hudson 2019). Our universe and sample of cases matches roughly that of 
the Comparative Constitutions Project: all independent countries from 1789–2016. 37 We 
are interested principally in the outcome of the vote, the percentage (or number) of votes 
34 Tierney, Constitutional Referendums.
35 Ibid, 11–12; Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power’ 
(2005) 12(2) Constellations 223–244. doi:10.1111/j.1351-0487.2005.00413.x.
36 Tierney, Constitutional Referendums, 12.
37 Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, ‘Characteristics of National Constitutions, 
Version 2.0.’ Comparative Constitutions Project. Last modified: April 18, 2014. Available at: www.
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for each choice on the ballot, as well as a series of other contextual variables (see below). 
Having no interest in reinventing the wheel, we build on the hard work of others who 
have started down this path. As far as we can tell, one of the best extant sources of data 
on referenda is a collection created by the Centre for Research on Direct Democracy. 258 
observations from their database make up something of a cornerstone for our collection. 
A second major source is the series of data handbooks created by Dieter Nohlen and 
his co-authors. The Nohlen handbooks contribute an additional 204 observations. For 
an additional 69 referenda, we collected data from national electoral agencies. Finally, 
we include data collected by Mads Qvortrup (38 observations) and Beat Müller (75 
observations). In all, our dataset includes 644 referenda spanning the years 1797 to 2016. 
We suspect that our sample comes close to matching the universe of cases, such that we 
have data on nearly every national-level constitutional referendum that has taken place 
during the last two centuries plus. We, of course, are not under any illusion that we have 
identified every referendum. How many we are missing, and whether those missing are 
missing systematically, is not yet clear to us.
Given the binary obsession on winning, the point of greatest interest for readers may 
be the ratio of successes to failures in ratifying referenda. Nevertheless, a first question 
has to do with the incidence of the votes themselves. We thus begin this section with 
some descriptive information about the use of constitutional referenda over time, and the 
regions of the world where they have seen the greatest use.
B. The Incidence of Constitutional Referenda
How often do we observe referenda in the world’s national jurisdictions? How have they 
evolved over time? And where are their natural habitats, historically?
i. Temporal trends
In terms of both legal possibility and realized events, direct citizen involvement in 
constitutional reforms has become increasingly common. Although there were a number 
of isolated referenda in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, the modern return to the 
use of referenda began in the wave of constitution making after the First World War. 
Speaking of the frequent provision for referenda in constitutions drafted in that era, 
a contemporary scholar wrote that “the new constitutions have not been content with 
the mere statement of the fact of popular sovereignty, but have sought direct means of 
giving to the people the power of exercising their sovereign rights.”.38 In addition to this 
inter-war renaissance, there has been a large increase in the provision for constitutional 
referenda since the 1990s. In data from the Comparative Constitutions Project, we find 
that by 2013, 21 percent of constitutions provided for citizen-initiated constitutional 
amendments, while 59 percent provided for ratification of constitutional amendments 
through referenda (see Figure 7.1).
comparativeconstitutionsproject.org; Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, The 
Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
38 Agnes Headlam-Morley, The New Democratic Constitutions of Europe: A Comparative Study of 
Post-War European Constitutions with Special Reference to Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, 
the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats & Slovenes and the Baltic States (Oxford University Press 1928).
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The use of  these institutional avenues for public input varies greatly from year to year, but 
the trend has been toward the increased use of referenda in constitutional change. In the 
2000s, an average of more than half  of the constitutional amendments that were approved 
had been submitted to the voters in a referendum (see Figure 7.2). In a particularly busy 
year, as many as a dozen countries may have a constitutional referendum (including those 
on amendments and new constitutions). The average since 1945 has been 4.7 instances 
per year.
ii. Geographical trends
Evidently, many countries have never treated their citizens to a constitutional referendum, 
while some (such as Switzerland and Australia) hold them regularly – on average, more 
than one per year in the Swiss case. In Figure 7.3 below, we depict the number of elec-
tions since 1789 in which each state has placed a constitutional referendum on the ballot. 
Countries in white are those who have never held a constitutional referendum, while 
darker shades of grey indicate higher numbers.39 (Our apologies to geographically small 
39 Note that the count here is referendum questions, not occasions on which a vote(s) took 
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Figure 7.1  Constitutions in force that provide for public initiative and ratification for 
constitutional amendments, by year
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states for their lack of visibility in the maps.) There is no discernible (to us) regional trend, 
which indicates the global penetration of the practice. Rather, many countries around the 
world have used a referendum to settle a constitutional question at least once. Continent-
level rates are not particularly helpful, but we can say that in those terms, Oceania leads 
the way with a rate of more than ten referenda per state. South America and Europe 
appear high on that measure as well.
Africa’s total seems especially high given the relative age of its states. Indeed, ratifying 
referenda have been common in Africa precisely because of the process of gaining inde-
pendence from colonial powers. The first constitutional referendum on the continent took 
place in Liberia in 1847, the year Liberian founders declared independence. In all, a total 
of 40 African states have held at least one constitutional referendum. Morocco heads the 
list with nine. Niger, Madagascar, and Egypt have each held seven. Most of the African 
referenda have been on replaced or new constitutions, with relatively few on amendments.
Constitutional referenda have been comparatively rare in Asia, with only two countries 
making regular use of them. Perhaps surprisingly, the country that has submitted the 
greatest number of constitutional changes to voters is Azerbaijan, where voters have 
place. In some cases voters have been presented with many questions on one occasion. We have 
counted each question separately.
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Figure 7.2  Incidence, by year, of the (1) amendments, and (2) replacements, of 
constitutions that involve a public referendum
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been asked to answer a record 67 referendum questions. These questions have been 
squeezed into four ballots. The most recent Azerbaijani referenda (2009 and 2016) have 
each included 29 questions regarding a host of changes to the constitution. The next 
most-frequent sighting of referenda in Asia has been in the Philippines, where leaders 
have held 13 constitutional referenda since 1935, including proposals for three new texts, 
and nine amendments.
Within Europe, the two countries that have held the most referenda are Switzerland 
(51) and Ireland (33). In both of these states, referenda are required to pass constitutional 
amendments. France has also made extensive use of referenda, with 12. France is also 
notable in that their 1793 referendum to ratify the second revolutionary constitution is 
the first observation in our dataset.
The vast majority of the constitutional referenda in North America have been in the 
Caribbean. It may not surprise those familiar with rates of constitutional transition 
that Haiti leads the way with 20 referendum questions, followed by the Bahamas with 
count
1 10
Notes: Accumulated number of referenda between 1789–2016.
Figure 7.3 An historical count of constitutional referenda, by region
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nine. The most democratically suspect of Haiti’s referenda occurred during the Duvalier 
dictatorship, but Haitians have been deciding on constitutional change through referenda 
as early as 1918 (when they hosted one while under US occupation). Given our interest in 
elite (mis-)calculations, it is notable that it was a referendum-too-far that led to the ouster 
of the Duvalier regime. Although the Duvaliers had pushed through a clearly fraudulent 
referendum in 1971, the equally manipulative constitutional referendum of 1985 was evi-
dently too much for the people of Haiti, and inspired the protests the following year that 
finally pushed the Duvaliers out of power. The constitutional referenda in the Bahamas 
are worthy of special note because Bahamian voters have rejected all nine proposals, a 
seemingly disastrous record by global historical standards.
Constitutional referenda have been reasonably popular in South America, although 
two of the continent’s largest countries have not held any. Colombia has made the great-
est use of constitutional referenda, having put 16 constitutional questions to the people. 
All but one of these questions were asked in one referendum in 2003. On that occasion, 
despite high levels of support among those who voted, only one question was answered 
with enough valid votes (greater than 25 percent of registered voters) for the measures to 
pass. Uruguayan voters have had the opportunity to vote on constitutional changes on 13 
occasions, with a total of 15 questions. The majority of these have been on constitutional 
amendments, but in 1980 the Uruguayan voters turned down a new constitution proposed 
by the military regime. Despite this seemingly clear answer from the people, the regime 
implemented some of the proposed changes anyway.
Although Australia is the most conspicuous natural habitat for referenda on our map, 
some of the island nations of Oceania are also noteworthy settings. Australia has had 
an impressive 46 constitutional referenda since 1898. Undeterred by failure in their first 
referendum in 1898, Australians proceeded to approve their current constitution through 
a referendum in 1900. Appropriately, that constitution stipulates that changes to the text 
must be approved through the voters in a referendum. Yet only eight of the 44 subsequent 
attempts to change the constitution have received sufficient support from the voters. 
Excessive yea-saying does not appear to be a problem among Australians, at least in the 
constitutional context. The neighboring Marshall Islands are not far behind Australia in 
terms of referendum activity, having submitted 40 constitutional changes to its 50,000 
citizens, on three occasions. The constitution of the newly-independent Marshall Islands 
40 Not standardized by year, which underestimates the rate of relatively new states and Africa 
in particular.
Table 7.1 Referenda and outcomes by continent (1789–2016)
Africa Asia Europe N. America S. America Oceania
Rejected 6 2 43 17 25 97
Passed 123 122 110 24 28 47
Total 129 124 153 41 53 144
Rate/country40 2.39 2.58 3.48 1.78 4.42 10.29
Source: Hudson 2019.
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was passed in a referendum in 1979. In 1990, a package of four proposed constitutional 
amendments passed, while in the next referendum in 1995 only one of the 35 proposals 
passed. The Federated States of Micronesia have also presented a large number of 
constitutional proposals to the voters, including one for a new constitution in 1978, which 
passed. Again, many of these proposals have come in packages. In the only other episode 
in Micronesia, the voters approved only four of 26 proposed changes to the constitution.
Some of these findings speak to the success (and lack thereof) of referendum proposals, 
which constitutes our central research question, and one to which we now turn.
C. Success and Failure in Constitutional Referenda
Our primary preoccupation – and probably that of leaders in David Cameron’s unenvi-
able position – is to establish some baseline forecast of the voting public’s response to 
constitutional questions on referenda. To what degree have citizens backed elite proposals, 
historically? Generally, most proposals pass, but it turns out that the passage rate depends 
substantially on whether the proposal is for a replacement as opposed to an amendment. 
In referenda on new constitutions, the voters have approved 94 percent of proposals, as 
against 61 percent of revision proposals (Table 7.3). 94 percent seems in line with at least 
our expectations of rampant yea-saying. But 61 percent is not only relatively lower, as 
expected, but also rather low in absolute terms. Hitting safely 60 percent of the time may 
be an impressive batting average in baseball’s major leagues, but it is decidedly not so in 
constitutional politics. Leaders should be doing better with voters, one would think.
While win/loss is an important and decisive binary outcome, the underlying distribu-
tion of votes provides a more precise picture. As one would expect, not only are the 
passage rates different between replacements and amendments, but so too are their 
margins of victory. New constitutions often pass with a relatively high level of support, 
while the margins are much tighter in amendment votes. On average, replacements receive 
84 percent of the vote, while amendments receive 73 percent. Figure 7.4 depicts the two 
distributions across the 644 proposals in our sample. Both distributions are highly skewed 
toward 100 percent, which indicates an unusually high degree of consensualism; clearly, a 
large and distinct species of these votes has a unanimous flavor. However, compared with 
that of replacement votes, the distribution of amendment votes is more uniform, with a 
dense outcropping of votes around 50 percent. The decisions around amendments seem 
clearly to be more contested – sometimes highly so – than those around new constitutions.
Average effects can be misleading. It seems quite possible that there is some heteroge-
neity in the way amendments and replacements operate across countries. Indeed, when 
we unpack the data, it is evident that amendments are contested in some places but not 
others. Many of the close amendment votes have taken place in settings with vigorous 
democratic cultures (such as Australia, Ireland, and Switzerland), while many of the 
lopsided ratifications have occurred in countries in which the official vote counts are more 
suspect, such as Azerbaijan.41 Likewise, it seems that votes to ratify new constitutions 
have more often taken place in less democratic states. So, part of the difference between 
41 In fact, among the 44 Swiss constitutional amendments we include in our dataset, the 
median “yes” vote is 48.8 percent, while the mean is 50.3 percent. 
LANDAU PRINT.indd   154 13/08/2019   13:27
The constitutional referendum in historical perspective  155
replacement and amendment could be a selection effect, in that amendment reform is 
a practice of competitive democracies with stable constitutions whereas replacement is 
more likely to be found in noncompetitive states. In the analysis below, we evaluate exactly 
these sorts of questions.
We further explore these expectations of success and failure in constitutional referenda 
in a multivariate analysis. In particular, we run a set of logistic regression models predict-
ing the success (or not) of constitutional proposals. Given the differences in passage rates 
between replacement and amendment proposals, we conduct the analysis within three 
samples: (1) all proposals, (2) replacements only, and (3) amendments only. Note that in 
the case of replacements, the very low number of failures has the potential to bias our 
estimates, so we estimate a rare events logistic regression using the Zelig package.42
42 Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Olivia Lau, Zelig: Everyone’s Statistical Software (2007) 
Table 7.2 Success and failure of constitutional referenda (1789–2016)
New Constitutions Amendments
Ratified Rejected Total Ratified Rejected Total
Number 168 11 179 277.4% 174 451
% 93.9% 6.1% 100% 61.4% 38.6% 100%
Source: Hudson 2019.
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Figure 7.4 Margin of victory in constitutional referenda (1789–2016)
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Our first model (Table 7.2, column 1) explores the regional dynamics more systemati-
cally. Note that the table presents the odds ratios associated with success; estimates greater 
than one represent increased odds and those less than one represent decreased odds. 
We estimate the effects of region on outcome (success or not) for all types of referenda 
(replacement and amendment). The results provide a more precise geographic cut at what 
seems (in the descriptive numbers above), to be some significant variation in passage 
rates across regions. The model includes dummy variables for each region except  for 
Europe (East and West), the reference category. We also include a dummy variable for 
Switzerland, a unique setting for both incidence and outcome; Switzerland accounts 
for a full eight percent of cases in the sample. The results suggest two distinct geographic 
clusters: South America and Oceania, where referenda are significantly more prone to 
failure than they are in Europe. In both regions, proposals are roughly one fifth (odds 
ratios of 0.21 and 0.18) as likely to pass than they are in Europe.
We recognize that the competitiveness of referenda elections will – almost by  definition 
– vary with levels of democracy. Each model in Table 7.2 thus includes a measure 
of democracy (Polity). Sure enough, the results seem to corroborate the adage (a la 
Przeworski43) that democracies are those systems in which elites can and do lose elections 
(though not in the case of replacement constitutions). A shift of one standard deviation 
up (towards democracy) on the democracy variable decreases the probability of winning 
an amendment referendum by 40 percent. This result seems to corroborate intuitions (and 
scattered evidence) about elite manipulation and/or oppression in non-democratic refer-
enda. For example, Wheatley and Germann had found something similar in a smaller-bore 
investigation of some 30 cases.44 The authors identified a class of constitutions that were 
ratified through referenda as a sort of “rubber-stamp” on a non-democratic constitution. 
They described these constitution-making exercises as “characterized by minimal public 
participation and a referendum that was no more than a fig leaf to mask authoritarian 
rule.”45 Our aggregate results, together with other theory and evidence, seem to accord with 
the intuition that the uncertainty surrounding referenda results is limited to democracies.
We also reason that it should matter whether the referendum is a stand-alone vote, or 
coincident with another election. One thing that happens in comprehensive ballots is that 
more voters turn out. A larger, more representative set of voters may not actually be propi-
tious for a government interested in rubber stamping its reforms. As such, our expectation 
is that, on average, holding the referendum alongside another election would tend to 
decrease its probability of success. As it happens, it is hard to make any such a comparison 
for new constitutions. There are only 18 cases in which a new constitution was ratified in 
http://GKing.harvard.edu/zelig; Christine Choirat Christopher Gandrud, James Honaker, Kosuke 
Imai, Gary King, and Olivia Lau, Relogit: Rare Events Logistic Regression for Dichotomous 
Dependent Variables. Zelig: Everyone’s Statistical Software (2017) http://zeligproject.org/.
43 Przeworski, A. (1986).  Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy. In 
G. O’Donnell, P. C. Schmitter, & L. Whitehead (Eds.),  Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: 
Comparative Perspectives (Vol. 3). Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
44 Jonathan Wheatley and Micha Germann, ‘Outcomes of Constitution-Making: Democratization 
and Conflict Resolution’ in Jonathan Wheatley and Fernando Mendez (eds.), Patterns of Constitutional 
Design: The Role of Citizens and Elites in Constitution-Making (Routledge 2013) 49–68.
45 Ibid, 55.
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a referendum alongside an election, and none of them has failed. Based on these sparse 
data, contemporaneous elections are a perfect predictor of success, but of course, success 
is probable in that domain anyway. But there are sufficient data to estimate the effect of 
referendum timing for the amendments, and here we see that having the referendum on 
the same day as another election is a statistically significant predictor of failure.
Finally, we expect that when referenda are mandatory, they will be less likely to succeed. 
Our sense, as we elaborate below, is that a prior commitment to hold a referendum forces 
the hand of elites, who might otherwise opt not to test the treacherous waters of public 
approval. It is difficult to accurately code the legal necessity of constitutional referenda, 
but we proxy this by using a variable from the Comparative Constitutions Project, which 
captures whether or not the constitution then in force required constitutional amend-
ments to be ratified through a referendum. Nevertheless, we find no significant relation-
ship between this variable and the success of a proposal among either new or amended 
constitutions. Some of this non-relationship could be a result of measurement error in our 
Table 7.3 Probability of referenda success (logistic regression – odds ratios)
Universe
Replacements and 
Amendments
Replacements and 
Amendments
Replacements Amendments
Intercept 12.69***
(5.96)
9.55***
(3.41)
0.04***
(0.02)
9.40***
(5.04)
Democracy (Polity2) 0.81***
(0.04)
0.80***
(0.02)
0.86
(0.07)
0.79***
(0.03)
North America 0.49
(0.29)
South America 0.21***
(0.09)
Africa 2.21
(1.29)
Asia 3.31
(2.71)
Oceania 0.18***
(0.08)
Switzerland 1.81
(0.74)
Constitutional provision  
  for popular approval 
of amendments
1.27
(0.47)
2.83
(2.40)
1.18
(0.58)
Referendum at same  
  time as election
0.41***
(0.14)
0.36**
(0.13)
AIC
BIC
Log Likelihood
Deviance
Num. obs.
346.44
379.62
2165.22
330.44
468
385.86
402.32
2188.93
377.86
452
53.24
62.22
223.62
47.24
147
299.28
314.03
2145.64
291.28
295
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measure of mandatoriness (see below). Still, we find little prima facie evidence to suggest 
that the hand of leaders is forced into ill-advised votes.
III. A FOCUS ON FAILED REPLACEMENTS
The failure of new (replacement) constitutional proposals is a fairly rare event, which lends 
itself  to some more intensive case analysis. To recall, while failures are rare for replacement 
proposals, they are relatively common among amendment proposals. Failures account for 
only 11 of the 179 single-question referenda on new constitutions held since 1793. As we 
describe above, we expected that some of these failures were less about miscalculation and 
more about elite commitments to ratification. That is, we expected that referenda would 
fail to ratify a new constitution only in cases in which the referendum was unavoidable, 
either because the government was bound by constitutional law, a court ruling, or a prior 
agreement to hold the referendum. Call this a forced-hand theory. The argument is based on 
the common-sense notion that governments will not submit their proposal to a vote unless 
they are reasonably certain of success. Throughout the literature on referenda, there is an 
assumption that political elites have a good understanding of the probabilities that public 
votes will approve their projects. And yet, elites seem to have faced rejection in 11 cases46 
in which voters were asked a simple up/down question47 about the proposed constitution.
In our statistical analysis above, we found that constitutional commitments to ratifica-
tion were not associated with failure of new or amendment proposals, but we must admit 
that our proxy for “forced-handedness” is a relatively weak one. Through a brief  study of 
the history of these 11 cases, we find that in five of these cases, the referendum was to some 
degree mandatory. As we describe above, the line between mandatory and discretionary 
is sometimes quite fine. In only three of these cases (Estonia twice, and Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines) was the referendum constitutionally mandated. As noted earlier, in 
Kenya in 2005, the referendum was required by the Nairobi High Court, on the basis of 
its interpretation of the practical requirements of popular sovereignty in constitutional 
reform. In the final mandatory case, the French constitutional reform that followed 
the end of the Second World War involved several referenda on constitutional reform. 
Critically, a 1945 referendum itself  decided aspects of the constitution-making process, 
including a mandate that the new constitutional text be ratified through referendum.48 
This effectively committed the French government to a referendum to ratify the new text 
in 1946. Following this procedure, a new constitutional text was voted down in May 1946. 
A revised proposal was approved in a second referendum in October 1946.49
46 Netherlands (Batavian Republic) 1798, Australia 1898, Estonia 1932, Estonia 1933, France 
1946, Uruguay 1980, Seychelles 1992, Albania 1994, Zimbabwe 2000, Kenya 2005, Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines 2009. 
47 We make this last distinction because in some cases voters have been presented with more 
than one option. We exclude those cases from this count because of the simultaneous successes 
and failures.
48 Jon Cowans, ‘French Public Opinion and the Founding of the Fourth Republic’ (1991) 17(1) 
French Historical Studies 62–95. doi:10.2307/286279.
49 The constitution voted on in May 1946 had been drafted by two leftist parties, and provided 
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The opposite of the forced-hand failures are the unforced errors. These are cases in 
which referendum appeared to be optional, but yet the leaders scheduled one anyway and 
lost. Among such cases, four (Uruguay 1980, Seychelles 1992, Albania 1994, Zimbabwe 
2000) involve an ambitious executive or an autocratic regime that held a referendum on 
their own constitutional project. These four cases are in some ways the most interesting, 
since they are instances in which it seems that the referendum could have been avoided 
entirely; yet, like Cameron and his Brexit decision, the leaders appeared to have miscalcu-
lated badly with dramatic consequences.
Our remaining cases of a failed vote are somewhat different. Details about the earliest 
case, a referendum in an early 19th century incarnation of the Netherlands (the so-called 
Batavian Republic) that took place in 1798, are difficult to confirm. It appears that this 
referendum was optional, and that the vote took place by voice, among a very small elec-
torate. In this sense, it is not clear how comparable the case is to more modern referenda, 
though we remain curious about the event.
The Australian case in 1898 also stands by itself. The circumstances of the vote 
concerned the drafting of the first constitution of a united and self-governing Australian 
Commonwealth. The colonial governments50 agreed that there would be a referendum to 
approve the new constitution, and that there would be additional requirements about the 
threshold of the “yes” vote in each of the colonies. A majority of the overall votes were 
for approval, but the referendum narrowly missed the required threshold in one of the 
colonies. This referendum was by all accounts optional, though the circumstances of its 
failure are somewhat unique (at least among referenda on new constitutions).
Reviewing the 11 cases then, we find that a full five of these failed referenda were 
mandatory. Four of the referenda appear to have taken place on the basis of a mistaken 
belief  that the voters would approve the constitutional project proposed by a power-
seeking leader. The remaining two cases have elements that make them less comparable 
to the others. Our sense, then, is that we have just as many unforced errors as we do 
forced ones. That is, referenda do not fail only in circumstances in which leavers have no 
choice in holding the referendum. Miscalculation is responsible for half  of these failures 
and, what is more, some of the miscalculation comes at the hands of autocrats, who may 
underestimate either the courage or loyalty of their citizens.
IV.  EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
REPLACEMENTS AND AMENDMENTS
The central puzzle lurking in these data is the striking difference between amendments 
and replacements with respect to success. Why? We can begin to test empirical implica-
tions related to various explanations, but at this point in the research cycle it also makes 
for a unicameral parliamentary system of government. This was opposed by parties of the center 
and the right. The October 1946 proposal was much like that the constitution of the Third 
Republic, with a bicameral parliament, and a weak, indirectly elected president. Alistair Cole, 
French Politics and Society (Routledge 2017).
50 Australia was ruled ruled as six separate colonies at this time.
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sense to engage in ideation – to think broadly about possible suspects.51 One can classify 
the plausible explanations from the perspective of (1) citizens and that of (2) elites. The 
background assumption is that the inquiry allows us to understand democratic processes 
better.
A. Elite Behavior
One explanation recognizes that elites are strategic and opportunistic, and more or less so 
under certain conditions. Arguably, authorities have considerably more discretion in the 
planning and introduction of a referendum vote in the case of replacements than they do 
in that of amendments. Whether, when, and how are important factors in the success of 
ballot questions and discretion on those questions matters.
In general, we have good reason to believe that elites have historically had greater leeway 
in deciding whether or not to subject a new constitution to a referendum.52 For one thing, 
as new constitutions are created in a new exercise of constituent power, it is easier to justify 
a new ratification process. We can test, or at least probe, this assumption. Recall that CCP 
data records whether or not a referendum is a part of a constitution’s amendment process. 
That data point informs us about procedural expectations. The relevant empirical test 
then, is whether a replacement constitution is approved through referendum in cases in 
which a referendum would have been required for an amendment. That is, to what degree 
have elites avoided a referendum under conditions in which a referendum was expected, 
or in some sense, required. The CCP’s dataset on constitutional events records 728 new 
constitutions between 1789 and 2014. Among these, there have been 68 new constitutions 
in which a referendum might be expected given the amendment procedures of the prior 
constitution. Exactly half  (34) of those were in fact ratified through a referendum. Thus, 
among those constitutions emerging from a clearly specified referendum tradition, a full 
50 percent avoid the referendum. That, to us, appears to be a remarkably high number 
and suggests that political elites may in fact exercise a significant degree of discretion in 
their decision about whether to invoke a referendum vote.
Whether this discretion helps elites avoid election failure is another question. We 
investigated this possibility indirectly in the regression analysis above. That is, we tested 
the assumption that seemingly obligatory votes would fail at higher rates than would 
voluntary ones. The macro data showed little evidence for this proposition, though as the 
use of “seemingly” in the prior sentence suggests, we harbored some skepticism about the 
measurement of obligation. A closer case analysis of replacement failures revealed that 
half  of the failed votes were, in fact, required. Small sampling issues aside, that pattern 
suggests that we cannot rule out the idea that failures stem from obligatory referenda.
Another possibility revolves around the relative importance of replacements compared 
with amendments, something that affects both elites and masses. In the case of elites, it 
may be that they invest more resources in marketing a full text to the public than they do 
in raising support for individual amendments.
51 Thanks to David Landau for sharing various ideas in this section.
52 The ubiquity of ratifying referenda over the past several decades is likely to reduce the ability 
of elites to ratify referenda through other means going forward.
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A cross-cutting set of explanations – related to the type of elite actor – has to do with the 
findings regarding democracy above. It seems likely that non-democrats are more likely 
to replace a constitution than are democrats,53 and since the proposals of non-democrats 
do better at the polls than do democrats (whether legitimately, or otherwise), the relative 
success of replacement provisions may just be something of an indirect regime-type effect.
B. Citizen Behavior
A second set of explanations focuses on the behavior of voters. Clearly, voters face differ-
ent decisions under the two conditions. Under the replacement condition, voters are asked 
to react to a comprehensive, symbolic, and once-in-a-lifetime reform. Under the other, 
they face a discrete and, probably, more narrow reform. Consider the cognitive challenges 
in assessing aggregate versus specific proposals. For example, imagine the evaluation of 
the Japanese Constitution, as a document, as against the evaluation of its Article 9, the 
famous peace clause. Or an evaluation of the US Constitution, on the one hand, and the 
second amendment (the right to bear arms), on the other. Aggregate proposals, such as a 
full constitutional document, are, by definition, multidimensional, whereas amendments 
are mostly unidimensional. Furthermore, aggregate proposals are typically not only 
multidimensional, but also substantially longer: roughly the difference between reading a 
paper of ten to 20 thousand words versus reading a paragraph. Both of these properties 
(multidimensionality and length) lead, we suspect, to non-opinions. Non-opinions, when 
translated to votes, might well be overwhelmed by an affirmative response bias (yea-
saying). That is, there will be a lot of noise and very little signal in one’s assessment of 
the content, and much of the signal in the assessment will come from a systematic error 
(response bias) embedded in the measurement instrument (ballot question).
One way to think of this phenomenon is as an example of the philosophical concept 
of emergence, in which a phenomenon is more than the sum of its parts. For example, 
individually-ordinary water molecules, whose fractal patterns comprise a snowflake, 
emerge as something beautiful only in the aggregate. Similarly, with respect to constitu-
tions, one may quibble with parts of a text if  asked to consider them individually, but still 
profess a high opinion of the text (mostly, perhaps, because one has not actually read it).54 
We thus expect that, on average, specific proposals for amendments – especially ones that 
are clearly stated – will be more contested than full constitutions will be.
Given the challenge of aggregate proposals, some states have pursued a hybrid approach, 
in which they assess citizens’ evaluation of both the draft as a whole as well as its more 
53 Elkins, Ginsburg, Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions.
54 As a concrete example, just such an expectation was likely at work in the way the govern-
ment framed the referendum on Canada’s Charlottetown Accord in 1992. As Clarke and Korberg 
describe it, “the government’s decision to phrase the [single] question in a very general way 
may have reflected recognition of the threat to a ‘yes’ majority posed by a coalition of negative 
minorities who disagreed with one or more specific aspects of the proposal. By deemphasizing 
its particulars and asking voters for a simple yes or no verdict on the entire package, this threat 
might be minimized.” Harold D. Clarke and Allan Kornberg, ‘The Politics and Economics of 
Constitutional Choice: Voting in Canada’s 1992 National Referendum’ (1994) 56(4) The Journal of 
Politics 940–962. doi:10.2307/2132068, p. 943.
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specific elements. Some examples include Bolivia (2009) and Iceland (2012). The adoption 
of Brazil’s 1988 Constitution provides an interesting variant; there, drafters scheduled a 
referendum on fundamental aspects of the Constitution (specifically, on presidentialism 
and on the restoration of the monarchy) five years after the Constitution’s adoption.
Another way to understand citizen attitudes is to think about their approach to the 
risk associated with reform. The data would suggest that voters are more risk-taking 
(reform accepting) in the context of  wholesale reform than they are in the context of 
small-scale reform. Why would that be? Why might amendment proposals provoke 
status-quo favoritism, while replacement proposals provoke what appears to be an 
adventurous gamble? One reason might be that citizens can more fully understand 
the risk associated with narrow concrete reform. In that amendment case, the risk 
appears real, and voters adopt the kind of  risk-averse behavior that prospect theory 
might suggest.55 Another explanation, consistent with prospect theory, might be that 
those considering a new constitutional proposal may feel that they are operating in the 
domain of  losses. That is, voters may perceive that they face two bad choices: stick with 
the failed status quo or gamble with the new one. In the domain of  losses (failed status 
quo arrangements), individuals are often more risk accepting, which may lead them to 
support a new constitutional regime.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The referendum device seems to have great appeal to political leaders, and for obvious 
reasons. It offers an unmatched opportunity to gain popular approval, and can also be a 
means of bypassing obstacles (i.e. other constitutional actors) within the political system. 
But as we have seen in recent years, some leaders have misjudged their ability to convince 
voters to approve their projects, sometimes with results that may have been destructive to 
both their own careers and their nation’s prosperity.
Like many, we are curious about how to handicap a referendum election. Do such 
proposals usually pass, or is Brexit more common than we might think? And what condi-
tions would affect the probability of a referendum’s passing? Scholars and, probably more 
often, leaders(!) have pondered these questions. Our approach is to collect and analyze 
the historical data. Having done so, we are left with a very clear baseline finding. Votes 
on full constitutions almost never fail (they fail six percent of the time), while those on 
amendments fail 40 percent of the time.
We had expected high passage rates, in general, and the modest passage rates for amend-
ments gives us pause. Yet we have some strong theoretical priors about why referenda on 
amendments are distinct from those on new constitutions. These factors operate on both 
the elite and mass levels. Specifically, replacement proposals allow elites significant discre-
tion as to the timing and procedure of referenda; by contrast, amendment proposals are 
more procedurally constrained. But also, the practical and cognitive dynamics of these 
votes, as voters apprehend them, are substantially different. Specifically, factors such as 
the multidimensionality and length of full constitutions in comparison with amendments 
55 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011).
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lead to an accentuation of affirmative response bias among voters. We have character-
ized this as a constitution taking on a quality of emergence for voters, in which whole 
 constitutions take on properties that may not be shared by their parts.
We are motivated, in part, by the question of how we might advise – purely  hypothetically 
– would-be constitution revisers on their prospects in a referendum. Who is to say as to 
whether these votes should pass, by whatever welfare perspective. Regardless, our findings 
suggest that leaders maximize their chances of success when the constitutional change 
takes the form of a new constitutional text. If  amendments are the chosen path, more 
amendments are better than fewer, and special referenda are better than those that co-
occur with other elections. However, from the perspective of the citizen who wishes to 
effectively exercise a veto on potentially anti-democratic constitutional change, the reverse 
is true. Indeed, it may be that referenda on discrete changes at long intervals offer the 
voting public the best chance to correctly assess and arrest such changes.
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